A Brief Comparison of Insider Trading Law in Australia and Hong Kong

Introduction

In layman’s terms, Insider trading is the buying or selling of a security by someone who has access to material nonpublic information about the security.

Insider trading has been a prevalent phenomenon even in the most mature financial markets, particularly in the recent decade when the ubiquity of internet and innovation of financial products have brought new dimensions into the clandestine activities which added extra complexity and difficulty to detection, enforcement and prosecution work. Yet, also advancing with the growing sophistication of the illicit activities is the insider trading law in almost all mature jurisdictions, among them are Australia and Hong Kong. Both are prime regional financial centres and both are common law jurisdictions. Their respective regimes share a lot of commonalities, yet this paper observes that the Hong Kong regime in some important respects lag behind Australia’s.

In view of the vastness of the topic, this essay will focus on discussing the following key areas of the regimes which have been subject to debates: (1) rationale for the prohibitions; (2) basic structure of the two regimes; (3) major elements of the prohibitions; (4) insider trading in the takeover scenario.

The Australian insider trading law is set out in Division 3, Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act (‘CA”), and enforced by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”). The Hong Kong regime is set out in Division 4, Part XIII (civil regime) and Division 2 and Part IV (criminal regime) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”), which are administered by Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”).

Rationales behind the Prohibition

There are traditionally four theories to justify the prohibitions in both jurisdictions, which are (1) the fiduciary duty theory, (2) fraud or misappropriation theory, (3) equal access to information theory and (4) market integrity theory. None of these theories however are free from criticisms. The fiduciary duty theory, for example, cannot be applied to persons who are legally not fiduciaries, such as substantial shareholders. However, the recent approach by the judiciaries in both jurisdictions, it is observed, is based more on the fraud theory and market integrity theory. This is illustrated in two recent high profile insider trading cases in the two jurisdictions. In Australia, in R v. Xiao, where the accused, managing director of a Chinese company, confessed to having engaged in insider trading of shares of two ASX listed companies, of which his company was contemplating a takeover bid. When the NSW Supreme Court handed down a jail term of 8 years, the longest sentence in insider trading cases in Australia, Hall J emphasised that (1) insider trading is a form of cheating or fraud, and (2) “insider trading erodes public confidence in the fair, orderly and transparent operation of the market” and it not only has the capacity to undermine the integrity of the market but also has the potential to undermine aspects of confidence in the commercial world generally. In Hong Kong, in HKSAR v. Du Jun, where the accused was a managing director of Morgan Stanley Asia, which represented the Hong Kong listed subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned conglomerate, in relation to the listed subsidiary’s acquisition of certain Kazakhstan oilfields from its parent SOE, and to carry out oil price hedging. The accused was a member of the Morgan Stanley team for the transaction and learned of the intended acquisition and purchased shares of the listed subsidiary ahead of its announcement to the market, and made huge profits of around HK$23.3 million. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal, while reducing what was also the longest jail term for insider trading cases in Hong Kong, from 7 years to 6.3 years, endorsed the principles in the English case of R v. McQuoid that (1) insider dealing is a species of fraud; it is cheating, and (2) “the principles of confidentiality and trust, which are essential to the operations of the commercial world, are betrayed by insider dealing and public confidence in the integrity of the system which is essential to its proper function is undermined by market abuse”.

It is submitted that the fraud theory fits well into both cases, given the defendants were one way or another connected with the companies whose listed securities were the subject of insider trading. But what about the scenario where an unrelated third party who comes into possession of inside information by accident or mistake (for example, a recipient by mistake of an email from the CEO of a company who is planning a takeover bid for a listed company) who then conducts insider trading in reliance on those inside information? In this scenario, the insider does not stand in a fiduciary position or any position of trust and confidence or indeed does not have any relation at all, whether to the acquirer or target of the takeover. And who could be the victim of fraud, if at all? It is interesting to note in this connection the US case of Chiarella v. United States 445 U.S. 222 (1980), where the defendant was employed as a “markup man” by a printing company, and he worked on documents involving five corporate takeover bids. Although the documents were coded, he was able in each case to decipher the code, identify the target corporation, and purchased stock of the targets before public announcement of the takeover bids. After each bid was announced, he sold his purchased stock and made a profit.  In reversing the defendant’s conviction, the US Supreme Court concluded that, however improper his behavior, he was not guilty of fraud in the traditional sense, as the court reasoned that failure to disclose by corporate insiders is fraud because of their fiduciary obligation to the corporation’s shareholders, but the defendant had no relationship with the target shareholders from whom he bought stock – he was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions. If the conducts of the defendant in this case did not amount to fraud, it seems that the hypothetical case mentioned above is even a  step further away from fraud, because unlike the defendant in the Chiarella case, he was even not related to a third party who is related, contractually or otherwise, to the acquirer or target of a takeover bid!

It appears that the market integrity theory is the most convenient and all-embracing justification for prohibition on insider trading, which could encompass all other theories (as a mature financial market certainly cannot tolerate insider trading activities that involve breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of valuable and confidential corporate information by its officers or asymmetric access to price sensitive information) .

Basic Structures of the Two Regimes

The regimes in both jurisdictions entail both criminal and civil sanctions, which mean that breach of the respective insider trading law could result in either criminal or civil consequences.In Hong Kong, civil proceedings are usually commenced in a special tribunal called Market Misconducts Tribunal (“MMT”), which is vested with the jurisdiction to deal with not only insider trading but also other kinds of market misconducts such as stock market manipulation, false trading, price rigging etc. The standard of proof in the MMT is civil and thus proof on the balance of probabilities is sufficient. What is peculiar in MMT proceedings is that they are inquisitorial, instead of adversarial, in nature and  the object of MMT proceedings is to determine whether market misconduct has taken place, the identity of person engaged and the amount of profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the misconduct. The orders that the MMT can make include an order of disgorgement of profit to the government, disqualification order, cold shoulder order and cease and desist order.  Only the SFC may commence proceedings in the MMT. Proceedings in MMT are analogous to the civil penalty regime under s.1317E(1)(jf) – (jg) of CA. If a court is satisfied that the prohibitions on insider trading law under s.1043A(1) and (2) are  contravened, it must make a declaration of contravention and it may also ask the trader to pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty. The standard of proof is also civil, that is, proof on balance of probabilities only, and only ASIC is entitled to make an application for a declaration of contravention of a civil penalty provision. It therefore appears that the major difference between the MMT proceedings in Hong Kong and the civil penalty proceedings in Australia is that the former is inquisitorial in nature and instituted in a special tribunal, whereas the latter is still an adversarial proceeding and commenced in a court, whether the Federal Court or state supreme court.

The criminal regimes in both jurisdictions do not differ much. As in other criminal proceedings, the standard of proof in both jurisdictions is proof beyond reasonable doubts, which is difficult and high for such clandestine offences as insider trading. The SFC has made clear its position that it will “give priority to criminal proceedings over MMT proceedings where the conduct in question can be established to the criminal standard of proof and it is in the public interest to prosecute the case”.[1] The SFC is empowered to summarily prosecute insider trading offences, but if they are to be prosecuted as indictable offences, the prosecution decision has to be made by Hong Kong’s Director of Public Prosecution. This appears also to be more or less the same in Australia. In Australia, ASIC’s position seems to be less robust than SFC – ASIC does not prefer criminal proceedings to civil when it says that “[d]epending on the seriousness and consequences of the corporate wrongdoing, we pursue the regulatory and enforcement sanctions and remedies best suited to the circumstances of a case and what we want, and are able, to achieve….. We have the choice of pursuing punitive, protective, preservative, corrective or compensatory actions, or otherwise resolving matters through negotiation or issuing infringement notices.”

Obviously, the sanctions, whether criminal or civil, described above are aimed at penalising the traders, but do not compensate the victims. As far as compensating the victims is concerned, both regimes contain provisions to enable the victims of insider trading to claim against the relevant traders. In Hong Kong, it has been held that MMT proceedings do not affect civil liabilities. Section 281 and 305 of the SFO allow persons who suffer pecuniary damages to recover compensation from the persons who commit market misconducts including insider trading. Additionally, Hong Kong’s High Court is empowered under s.213 to grant, on the application of SFC, a series of civil remedies including injunctions, specific performance orders, prohibition orders, annulment orders etc. against the traders. In Australia, civil compensation order under s.1317HA of CA is also available to victims of insider trading and ASIC may also bring an action for damages under s.1043L(2) or (5) for the benefit of and in the name of the issuer of securities. Like its counterpart in Hong Kong, s.1043O of CA empowers the court to make orders similar to those under s.213 of the SFO.

Fundamental Elements of Prohibitions

In this section, we will compare the following fundamental elements of the prohibitions in the two jurisdictions:-

1. subject matter of insider trading

2. information not generally available

3. materiality of information

4. connection requirement

Subject Matter of Insider Trading

The Australian regime prohibits insiders from trading “Division 3 financial products”. Section 1042A of the CA contains not only a broad definition of Division 3 financial products, but also a non-exhaustive definition, as ss.(e) provides “any other financial products that are able to be traded on a financial market”. The Hong Kong regime prohibits insiders from trading “listed securities” or their “derivatives”. Listed securities, as defined in s.245 of the SFO, has an exhaustive definition, and they must be in relation to a listed corporation.

It therefore can be observed that Division 3 financial products in the Australian regime has a much broader definition than listed securities under the Hong Kong regime, as the former is not necessarily limited to securities in relation to listed companies and could include, for example, a forex derivative such as forex forward. A recent case in Australia could illustrate the difference of the two regimes in this aspect. In DPP v Hill [2012] VSCA 144, where the defendants, Hill and Kamay, were former classmates in Monash University. Hill subsequently joined the Australian Bureau of Statistics (“ABS”) as an analyst with access to ABS’s sensitive and unpublished information about main economic indicators such as labour force, retail trade, building approvals, and private expenditure data, which was not generally available to the public. Hill fed this information to Kamay who used the same to trade margin FX contracts on the foreign exchange derivatives market and made a huge profit of $8 million. The Victoria Supreme Court held that a margin FX contract was a financial product that was  a derivative, whose value  derived from the value of an underlying currency exchange rate and thus a Division 3 financial product. Both Hill and Kamay were convicted of insider trading. What is peculiar about this case is that first, the financial product concerned is not traditional securities of or relating to a listed corporation, but a totally different product of margin FX contracts, which are not linked to listed securities issued by corporations at all; second, the trader is not an officer of or relating to a listed company, but an officer of a public authority; third, the inside information concerned is not specific to a particular company, but an unpublished sensitive information about Australian economy generally which could trigger material impact on the financial market generally (including the stock market and foreign exchange market).  Had the same facts taken place in Hong Kong, the defendants could not have been convicted of inside trading under the Hong Kong regime, as the subject matter of inside trading i.e. margin FX contracts, does not fall within the definition of “listed securities” under SFO, which have a much narrower connotation than “Division 3 financial products”.

Information Not Generally Available

To trigger the insider trading provisions in both regimes, it is important that the information that the insider utilises to conduct trading must first be qualified as “inside information”. One of the major components of the definition of insider information in both regimes is the nature of the information. In the Australian regime, that information must not be “generally available”, and for the Hong Kong regime, the information must not be “generally known to the persons who are accustomed or would be likely to deal in the listed securities of the corporation”. The two regimes therefore share a commonality in this respect, though with different terminology – for the Australian regime, the information must be not generally available, and for Hong Kong’s, it must not be generally known. What is helpful for the Australian regime is that it provides a further detailed definition of “generally available” in s.1042C, while the Hong Kong regime fails to do so and therefore what exactly does “generally known” mean has to be left to case law.

Materiality

Both regimes require the information to have material effect on the price of securities or financial products. The Hong Kong regime, except providing that if the information is generally known it will be likely to materially affect the price of the listed securities, is devoid of further provisions regarding what exactly does “materially affect the price” mean, and therefore reference to case law is necessary.

In the Australian regime, s.1042D of the CA however has helpfully clarified what “material effect on price” in s.1042A means, by providing that “a reasonable person would be taken to expect information to have a material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products if (and only if) the information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly acquire Division 3 financial products in deciding whether or not to acquire or dispose of the first-mentioned financial products”. Succinctly put, the test under s.1042D is “therefore the influence of information on decision making”. It is submitted that this test is clear, straightforward and succinct.

Connection Requirement

The Hong Kong regime requires a “connection” between the trader and the corporation of  which he possesses  inside information. This primarily consists of five groups of persons: (i) substantial shareholders, directors, and employees of the corporation, or its related corporation, (ii) persons connected by professional or business relationship, (iii) transaction counter-parties privy to inside information, (iv) public officers and specified persons, and (v) persons in group (i) to (iii) within the 6 months preceding the relevant contravention.

In Australia, on the other hand, the “Griffiths Report” in 1989 has proposed the abolition of the connection requirement which proposal was subsequently accepted and enacted into law, and therefore in the current insider trading provisions of CA, the connection requirement no longer exists. In the Griffiths Report, the committee, recommended and concluded “[t]he offence of insider trading must have its genesis in the use of information derived from within a company. The existing prohibition requiring a person to be connected to the corporation which is the subject of the information unnecessarily complicates the issue. It is the use of information, rather than the connection between a person and a corporation, which should be the basis for determining whether insider trading has occurred.”

It is submitted that the connection requirement is unnecessarily narrow and will create an obvious loophole in the insider trading law, such as where the trader who being not in any way connected with the company concerned acquires the inside information by mistake or accident. Further, it seems that the connection  requirement finds its theoretical support in the guilt-based philosophy of breach of fiduciary duties and misappropriation of corporate assets, rather than the guilt-free approach of maintaining market integrity, equality of access to market information (regardless of the trader’s relationship with the source of information), which is the current mainstream philosophy underlying the insider trading law. It also appears that an unrelated trader who acquires inside information innocently and trades on the same is as morally culpable as a person picking up a wallet on the street uses the money therein as if it were his own instead of returning it to its owner or the police. The law would be bizarre and unreasonable if the latter is guilty of theft while the former is allowed to walk free. 

Takeover Scenario

The main difference between the Hong Kong regime and the Australian regime in this aspect is that the Hong Kong regime distinctly singles out, and makes a specific provision, for the takeover scenario, while the Australian regime does not. Section 270(1)(b) of the SFO specifically covers the bidder or offeror of a takeover bid. It is not all clear why the Hong Kong regime has to single out the takeover scenario and make specific provision to cover it, but it may be related to the connection requirement as the offeror of a takeover bid may not fall within the 5 types of persons mentioned above;  ; secondly, the specific provision in SFO for takeover bids highlights the significance of insider trading activities in takeover cases, which is true in both jurisdictions. The following table illustrates the extent of insider trading activities in takeover cases in Hong Kong[1]:-

Source: Enforcement of insider trading law in Hong Kong: What insights can we learn from recent convictions?

In Australia, in “Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia”, “[i]t has been said, and other research tends to show, that there is a distinct relationship between takeover activity and the level of insider trading.” The author attributes this phenomenon to two reasons: on the one hand, the large number of people, particularly advisers, involved in the takeovers, and on the other, substantial profits can be derived from insider trading in takeover cases as the bidder will invariably offer considerable premium to induce the target’s shareholders to sell their stake. These are the same as in Australian as in other jurisdictions.

It is interesting to note at this juncture two insider trading cases in the two jurisdictions, which involve takeovers. In SFC v. Young Bik Fung, where the SFC instituted civil proceedings in Hong Kong’s High Court, against an employed solicitor of Linklaters, which was  an international law firm acting for the substantial shareholder of a listed company in Hong Kong, in the privatisation (which involved a takeover bid) of the listed company. The facts of the case revealed that the solicitor did not belong to the team of Linklaters that worked on the privatisation but those in the team and that solicitor shared the same printers, photocopiers, secretaries and fax machines and the solicitor’s office was close to those of the partner and members of the firm who worked on the privatisation deal. The court found by necessary inference that the solicitor learned of details including pricing of the privatisation because of his close proximity with his colleagues who  handled the deal. He then tipped off his girlfriend (who was also a solicitor but in another law firm) and his sisters, and they then purchased shares in the target listed company before the privatisation was announced to the market and made a profit. There were evidence to show the existence of a “Chinese Wall” in Linklaters to militate against the possibility of accidental leaks of confidential information to people outside the team but such measures the court found were not “fool proof”. The court held that the solicitor was not a “connected person” because “[a]n employed solicitor who was not a member of the team working on the deal would not be in a position “which may reasonably be expected to give him access to relevant information” about that deal.” This case illustrates the danger and deficiency of the antiquated connection requirement which could exonerate an otherwise obvious insider trading case in takeover situation. Had the same facts taken place in Australia and governed by Australian law, there is no doubt that the employed solicitor would be found guilty of insider trading.

In Australia, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup, Citigroup included investment banking and equities trading operations, with a Chinese wall established between these two divisions. The investment banking division was the adviser to Toll Holdings Ltd (Toll) on its takeover bid of Patrick Corp Ltd (Patrick). Manchee, an employee of the equities trading division, purchased shares in Patrick for Citigroup’s own account a day before the planned announcement of the bid through the ASX. When employees of the investment banking division became aware of these purchases, Manchee was instructed to stop further buying of Patrick shares. Manchee responded by selling the Patrick shares purchased earlier that day. There was no evidence to show that Manchee knew of the takeover of Patrick. ASIC’s accusations against Citigroup were mainly two-fold: first, the instruction given to Manchee to stop buying Patrick shares was insider information and the subsequent sales of the Patrick shares amounted to insider trading by Citigroup; second, since senior officers of Citigroup knew of the takeover bid, knowledge of Manchee’s trading in the Patrick shares was attributable to Citigroup so as to make it liable for insider trading. The Federal Court dismissed both claims, because for the first claim, Manchee was not an officer of Citigroup and his knowledge was not attributable to Citigroup, and in any event, the claim had not established that he traded with knowledge that Citigroup was acting for Toll on the takeover of Patrick; the second claim failed because at the time of the Manchee sales, Citigroup had Chinese walls in place that satisfied the requirements of s. 1043F. The Federal Court’s rulings on both claims must be unassailable.

The two cases in both jurisdictions bear some similarities: both cases concern trading by employees of advisers for the bidders in takeovers (albeit in the Citigroup case, the employee was trading on account of his employer) and information barriers were found to exist in both firms. Yet, the Hong Kong traders were found to be buying with express knowledge of the inside information, whereas the other (i.e. Manchee) was not; the Hong Kong claim was brought against the employee of the adviser (and his tippees), but the Australian claim was directed against the adviser itself, which it is submitted must fail if ASIC could not prove knowledge on the part of Manchee but even it could, it is hard to attribute his knowledge to Citigroup unless it could be established that Citigroup’s board or management authorised his trading or that Manchee was an officer. But the Hong Kong claim almost failed because of the technical connection requirement. As the Australian regime has done away with the connection requirement, assuming Manchee had learned of the Toll takeover bid (whether by accident or on purpose) and traded on his own account, there is no question that he would be caught by the insider trading provisions under the Australian regime, but not Hong Kong’s.

Conclusion

To conclude, Hong Kong’s insider trading law lags behind that of Australia in many material aspects, even though some critics still think that the latter is “hopelessly complex”. Complex it may be, the complexity is necessitated by the difficult but inevitable question of what “the insider trading prohibition is concerned with [and which] people and activities … are to fall within it.” In this sense, a more sophisticated and meticulous regime is preferred to an over-simplified one, which creates uncertainties and unpredictability for market participants. Notably, two areas of the Hong Kong regime are deficient, as discussed above. First, the connection requirement is unreasonably antiquated and inconsistent with the current mainstream philosophy (which stresses protection of financial market integrity and equal access to corporate information instead of fiduciary position of the trader) that supports insider trading prohibition, and has to be abolished. Second, the (i) subject matter of prohibition (i.e. listed securities and their derivatives) and (ii) the definition of inside information in the Hong Kong regime are too narrow and cannot cater for the innovation and availability of rapidly changing types of financial products in the market these days. There is no reason that these two concepts have to be linked and restricted to a “listed corporation”. Instead, like the Hill case mentioned above, they could extend to financial products (e.g. margin FX contracts) which have no connection with a listed entity at all. This disparity in the scope of the two jurisdictions’ insider trading law, however, should be understood and appraised with reference to the respective roles and powers of the regulators in the two jurisdictions  – ASIC is primarily a regulator of corporations or body corporates in Australia, which is vested with extensive investigation powers in respect of not only financial market but also suspected contravention of Commonwealth or state law concerning management or affairs of or involving fraud and dishonesty relating to body corporates, whereas the SFC is basically only a regulator of Hong Kong’s securities and futures market, with mandate only to “maintain and promote the fairness, efficiency, competitiveness, transparency and orderliness of the securities and futures industry”. Simply put, ASIC is a corporate police, but SFC is but a regulator of securities and futures market only.

(This article is extracted from Edward Tai’s thesis in the subject “Securities and Financial Market Regulation” in the Master of Law programme of the University of New South Wales. All rights are reserved)

[1]   Hon Kiu Chan, Raymond Siu Yeung Chan and John Kong Shan Ho, Enforcement of insider trading law in Hong Kong: What insights can we learn from recent convictions?, 271 (2013) 28 Australian Journal of Corporate Law, at p.288

引言

簡單來說，內幕交易就是由已經獲得相關證券或金融產品的重要非公開信息的人進行的交易。即使在最成熟的金融市場，內幕交易也是一個普遍的現象，特別是在最近十年間，互聯網的普及以及金融產品的創新為這種隱秘的活動增加了檢測，執法和起訴的複雜性和難度。 然而，魔高一尺道高一丈, 隨著這種非法活動日益複雜化，反內幕交易法在近乎所有先進的金融市場也變得更加精密，其中包括澳大利亞和香港這兩個區域性的金融中心，而兩者均是普通法的地區。 他們各自的制度有很多共同點，但筆者認為，香港在某些重要方面落後於澳大利亞。

有鑑於這個題目的廣泛性，本文將重點討論以下幾方面：（一）禁止內幕交易的理論基礎; （二）兩地的基本監管架構; （三）禁止條文的主要內容; （四）在收購合併中的內幕交易。

澳洲內幕交易法見於其公司法（Corporations Act, “CA”)），且由澳洲證券投資委員會（”ASIC”）執行。 香港則載於《證券及期貨條例》，由香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會（ 證監會 ）執行。

禁止內幕交易的理論基礎

傳統上有四種理論支持禁止內幕交易：（一）違反誠信(fiduciary)責任、（二）挪用(misappropriation)或詐騙公司財產、（三）獲取信息能力的平等性; 和（四）維持金融市場秩序。 這四個理論各有長短。 例如，違反誠信責任理論就不能支持不壽誠信責任約束的人仕, 如上市公司的大股東(因為在英美法系的法律觀點認為, 股東是資本家(capitalist), 在參與公司事務上可以只考慮本身的利益, 因而不像董事一樣受誠信責任約束)。 但據筆者的觀察，最近在香港和澳洲的一些重大案件中, 兩地的法院均把禁止內幕交易的理論基礎定於詐騙和維持金融市場秩序之上。

無獨有偶, 港澳兩地近年均發生了涉及內幕交易的大案, 而兩宗案件都涉及華裔人士, 而兩地法院都在案中下達最長的刑期。

在澳大利亞，在轟動一時的R v. Xiao 案件中，被告是中國前政法委書記周永康手下劉漢在澳洲的漢龍礦業的董事，漢龍礦業準備在澳洲收購兩家上市礦業公司, 被告在收購公佈前大舉買入這兩家公司的股份, 還為購買的股份進行了股份融資。 他被新南威爾士州最高法院判處澳洲內幕交易案件最長的判刑的8年判刑，在判詞當中, 法庭強調的是，（一）內幕交易是欺詐的一種，和（二） 內幕交易侵蝕公眾對市場公平，有序，透明操作的信心，這不僅有可能削弱市場的操守，更可能減低投資者對商業世界運作的整體信心 。 而在香港, 在香港特區 訴 杜軍一案中，被告是摩根士丹利亞洲的執行董事, 該公司當時代表中國龍頭國企中信集團旗下在香港上市的資源業務旗艦中信資源有限公司, 中信資源準備向其母公司收購若干在哈薩克的油田。被告是當時摩根士丹利負責此交易的團隊成員，他在收購公佈前大舉買入中信資源的股份，因而獲得2330萬港元的巨額利潤。 在此案中, 香港上訴法院亦同時下達了香港內幕交易案件中最長的6.3年刑期，並引用英國案例（R v. McQuoid）的原則, 認為:（一）內幕交易是屬於欺詐案件，是一種詐騙行為，和（二） 對商業世界的運作至關重要的保密和信任原則被內幕交易違背了，公眾對對金融市場正常運作的信心亦被削弱了。

筆者認為，欺詐理論很切合這兩宗案件的案情，因為兩個被告都在某一程度上與內幕交易中所涉及的公司有著某一程度的關係。 但試想像另一個情況, 就是一個與相關上市公司全無關係的第三者無意中或以外地獲得了該公司的內幕信息（例如，一個人意外獲發一個載有收購某上市公司建議的電郵），進而利用這些消息進行內幕交易呢？ 在這種情況下，內幕人士根本不受任何守誠信或保密責任約束，而他與收購方或者被收購方均沒有任何關係可言, 所以根本談不上欺詐, 因為如果他的行為是欺詐的話,誰是欺詐的受害者？在此問題上, 美國有一宗有趣的案件(Chiarella v. United States 445 U.S. 222 (1980)）, 在此案中, 被告是受聘於一家印刷公司的標記員，他須處理涉及五項公司收購的文件。 雖然這些文件已經編碼，但他卻能夠在收購公佈前，破解編碼而得悉被收購公司的身份及收購價, 並購入這些公司的股份而獲利。 在推翻下級法院對被告的定罪時，美國最高法院認為，無論他的行為多麼不恰當，被告並不干犯傳統意義上的欺詐罪，因為法庭認為，公司內幕人士未披露消息屬於欺詐是因為他們對公司的股東負有誠信責任，但被告與他所購買股票的公司股東沒有任何關係, 他不是他們的代理人、信託人，他亦不是收購方付託信任的人。 事實上，他對交易雙方而言是一個完全的陌生人。 筆者認為, 如果在這種情況下被告的行為不等於欺詐，上述假設的情況更不能說是欺詐，因為在Chiarella案中的被告至少是受聘於一間印刷公司, 而這家印刷公司與收購方存在合約關係(受收購方所聘印刷收購文件), 但在以上假設的情況中, 內幕交易者與收購方及被收購方卻一點關係也沒有, 他只是意外的獲得收購信息！

看來，維持市場秩序是禁止內幕交易的最方便和涵蓋範圍最廣的最佳理由，可以包含所有其他道理（因為成熟的金融市場肯定不能容忍涉及違反誠信責任或公司高管盜用公司機密及有價信息的內幕交易) 。

兩地的監管架構

港澳兩地的制度都涉及到刑事和民事制裁，這意味著違反內幕交易法可能會導致刑事或民事後果。在香港，民事程序是在一個名為「市場失當行為審裁處（Market Misconducts Tribunal, “MMT”）」的特別法庭進行，在這審裁處進行的案件, 舉證標準是民事的標準, 亦即是衡量相對可能性就足夠了。而MMT獨特之處在於其聆訊程序是以研訊(inquisitorial)方式進行，而不是香港一貫的對立方式(adversarial)，且MMT聆訊的目的是確定市場失當行為是否已經發生，參與者的身份及從中獲得的利潤。 MMT可以發出多項的命令,包括利潤回吐令、取消資格令，冷淡對待令和停止令等等。只有證監會才可以在MMT提出訴訟。 MMT的訴訟程序類似於澳大利亞的民事處罰制度。在澳大利亞，在民事方面 , 如果法庭認為某人違反了內幕交易法，可向法院申請一個違反內幕交易的聲明, 如果法院證實確實已違反內幕交易法就必須作出此聲明，並要求進行交易的人支付罰款。澳洲的舉證標準也是民事標準，也就是衡量相對可能性就足夠了，只有ASIC才有權提向法院申請違反內幕交易聲明。由此看來，香港市場失當行為審裁處的民事訴訟，和澳洲的民事處罰程序之間的主要區別在於，前者在本質上是研訊(inquisitorial)方式，並在特別法庭進行，而後者仍然是一貫的對立方式(adversarial)，並在一般的法院進行。

在刑事上, 兩地的分野不大。 與其他刑事訴訟一樣，兩地的舉證標準都是以超出合理懷疑為準繩，這對於內幕交易這種隱秘的罪行是存在一定的舉證困難。 證監會已經明確地表明其立場，即若能滿足刑事的舉證標準時, 會優先考慮以刑事檢控而不是在失當行為審裁處以民事方式提訴, 因為證監會覺得這樣做更符合公眾利益。但在澳洲，ASIC的立場似乎沒有證監會那樣強悍, ASIC認為, 採取刑事或民事方式起訴取決於內幕交易行為的嚴重性, 而他們沒有偏向有一種方式起訴，他們追求的是一種最適合案情的監管、執法制裁與及救濟方式，以實現他們想要達到的目的, 而他們聲稱可以選擇懲罰性，保護性，預防性，糾正性或補償性的制裁方式，或通過談判解決爭端。I

顯然，上述無論是刑事還是民事的制裁都是為了懲罰內幕交易者，而不是賠償受害人。 就賠償受害者而言，兩地的法規均有相關條文容許內幕交易的受害者向進行內幕交易的人仕追討賠償。 在香港，MMT曾經裁定其裁決並不影響內幕交易人士的民事賠償責任。 證券及期貨條例第281條和第305條訂明，任何人士若因市場失當行為(包括內幕交易)而蒙受金錢損失, 可以向進行該等行為的人士追討。 此外，在證監會的申請下，香港高等法院亦可頒發一系列的民事濟助，包括禁制令、強制執行令、禁止令及廢止令等 。在澳大利亞，其公司法亦規定內幕交易的受害者可追討賠償, 而ASIC也可代表受害人追討賠償。和香港一樣，澳大利亞的公司法授權其法院頒發類似上述香港法院的命令。

內幕交易的基本元素

在本節中，我們將比較兩地內幕交易法的幾個重要元素：

1. 內幕交易的標的

2. 何謂”一般非公開的信息”

3. 信息的重要性

4. 關連性要求

內幕交易的標的

澳大利亞的內幕交易法, 禁止內幕人士進行所謂「第三類金融產品」的交易。澳洲的公司法對何謂第三類金融產品的定義十分廣泛，包含所有能夠在金融市場上進行交易的任何金融產品 。在香港, 《證券及期貨條例》則禁止內幕人士進行「上市證券」或其「衍生產品」的交易。 根據《證券及期貨條例》s.245條，上市證券必須與上市公司有關。

因此可見，澳洲的第三類金融產品的定義比香港《證券及期貨條例》中的「上市證券」或其「衍生產品」更廣泛，因為前者不一定限於上市公司的上市證券 ，舉例來說, 可以包括如外匯衍生工具這種和上市公司完全沒有關係的金融產品。 澳洲最近的一個案例（DPP v Hill [2012] VSCA 144）可以說明港澳兩個制度在這方面的差異。 被告Hill和Kamay是蒙納殊大學的老同學。 Hill隨後成為澳洲統計局（ABS）的分析師，獲得ABS有關主要經濟指標的未發布敏感信息（如勞動力，零售貿易，建築批准和私人支出數據），這些信息一般不讓公眾知曉的。 Kamay利用Hill給他的信息在外匯衍生產品市場上進行外匯孖展合約交易，並獲得800萬澳元的巨大利潤。 維多利亞州最高法院認為，外匯孖展合約是一種金融衍生產品，其價值來自相關貨幣匯率的價值，因此屬於第三類金融產品。 Hill和Kamay都被裁定內幕交易罪成立。此案的特別之處在於: 首先，此金融產品並非傳統的上市公司證券，亦非與上市公司有關，是完全不同的外匯孖展合約，與公司發行的上市證券一點都沒有關係; 第二，內幕交易者並非上市公司的高層人員，而是政府機構的公務人員;  第三，有關的內幕信息不是針對於某家公司的，而是與整體澳洲經濟有關而未發布的敏感信息，且可能會對金融市場（包括股票市場和外匯市場）產生重大影響。這宗案件令筆者想起在2007年中港股票直通車開通時, 有傳聞某些中國政府高層官員預先知道這消息然後於消息公佈前在香港股市大舉買入股票而獲利數十億, 這種消息在澳洲的內幕交易法會被視為內幕消息但在香港則未必! 由此可見, 香港的條例是存在一定的漏洞。

信息不普遍性

要觸發禁止內幕交易的條文, 相關訊息必須被界定為內幕消息。所以我們首先要了解信息的性質是什麼。。 在澳洲，要構成內幕訊息, 這些訊息必不能是可隨處獲得的(generally available) ；至於香港,  則訂明該等信息不能是 被一般習慣於或可能會買賣該公司的上市證券的人士知悉 。 因此，雖然使用不同的表述方式，但兩地的條文有一個共通點, 就是這些消息的普遍性: 在澳洲，信息不能是隨處都可獲得;在香港，是不能眾所皆知的 。 值得注意的是，澳洲的公司法第1042C條, 對何謂隨處可獲得的訊息, 提供了一些指引, 例如訊息不能從一般的觀察而獲得, 或消息不能從隨處我獲得的消息而推斷出來等。

信息的重要性

兩地的法律均要求相關訊息必須對對證券或金融產品的價格產生重大影響。 香港的《證券及期貨條例》訂明, “該等消息或資料相當可能會對該等證券的價格造成重大影響”, 但除此之外, 則沒有進一步界定何謂對證券價格造成重大影響, 而因此需要參考案例。

反觀澳大利亞, 其公司法第1042D條則比較清晰地界定何謂對價格產生重大影響，該條規定若該等消息能夠影響投資於某類金融產品的人士作出買入或出售決定則可被視為對價格可能產生重大影響。所以, 簡單地說，在澳大利亞, 凡能影響投資決策的訊息均可被視為對價格產生重大影響。

筆者認為, 澳大利亞對重要訊息的界定明顯較香港的清晰淺白。

關連性的要求

在香港,《證券及期貨條例》要求內幕人士與其掌握內幕消息相關的公司存在某種關係(connection)。 這主要指五種關係：（一）公司的大股東，董事和僱員，或其相關公司法人；（二）由專業或業務所產生關係的人仕(如律師, 會計師或審計師等)；（三）作為相關公司交易對手而與聞內幕消息的人仕（四）公職人員；（五）在違反內幕交易法前6個月內屬於以上第（一）至（三）類的人仕。

 在澳大利亞，這種關連性的要求已在1989年被取消。澳大利亞政府認為,要確定內幕交易是否發生的基礎應該是信息的使用，而不是一個人和一間公司之間的關係。

筆者認為，關連性的要求是不必要的，並且會造成內幕交易法的明顯漏洞，比如與相關公司不存在任何關係但卻意外地獲得內幕信息的人仕進行內幕交易則可逍遙法外。此外，此要求的理論根據似乎建立於違反誠信和挪用公司資產等以過失為本的基礎之上，而非維持市場秩序及資訊公平等當今主流哲學。從道德角度而言 ，一個與相關公司毫無關係的人因意外而獲得該公司的內幕信息而進行交易並獲利, 其在道德上的過失就像在街上拾遺不報並把財物據為己有的人一樣。 如果後者可能視作干犯盜竊罪，而前則可逍遙法外, 這種法律是不公平和不合理的。

在收購合併中的內幕交易

香港與澳大利亞在這方面的主要區別是，香港的內幕交易法中有特別針對收購情況的條文，但澳洲沒有。《證券及期貨條例》第270(1)(b)條特別把在上市公司收購中提出要約的人仕視為內幕人士。香港的內幕交易法為什麼訂立特別的條文針對收購合併情況還不是很清楚, 但以筆者的分析, 原因可能有兩個: 第一, 如果沒有這一針對性的條文, 收購中的要約方不能滿足上述關連性的要求, 因為要約方不屬於上述五類與相關公司存在關係的人仕:;第二,這是要突顯出內幕交易活動在收購案件中的高活躍性，這種情況在港澳兩地皆然。 下表列出了香港內幕交易活動在併購中的活躍程度：

圖片來源：Enforcement of insider trading law in Hong Kong: What insights can we learn from recent convictions?

在澳洲，在《賭場資本主義？ 在澳大利亞的內幕交易》“Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia” 一書中提到，一些研究資料顯示，收購活動和內幕交易存在特定的關係。作者將這種現象歸咎於兩個原因：一方面，併購活動牽涉大量人員參與，特別是顧問；另一方面，在收購案件中進行內幕交易可以獲得大量利潤，因為收購要約方往往提供可觀的溢價來誘使目標股東出售他們的股份。 這在澳大利亞和其他地方均是如此。

在香港和澳洲的內幕交易案件中，有兩個有趣的案例涉及併購情況的。 在香港 SFC v. Young Bik Fung一案中，證監會在香港高等法院對國際知名律師行年利達(Linklaters)的聘用律師提出民事訴訟，在此案中, 年利達代表一間上市公司的大股東對上市公司進行私有化。該受聘律師並不屬於負責私有化交易的團隊，但此律師和私有化的團隊共用了打印機、複印機、傳真機以及秘書，而該律師的辦公室也接近於負責私有團隊律師的辦公室。 法庭因而推斷，該律師因為工作上與負責私有化的團隊有密切的聯繫, 因而獲悉了私有化交易的細節，包括定價。 然後，他通風報信給他的女朋友和他的妹妹，然後在目標上市公司公佈私有化方案之前購買其股票並獲利。年利達律師行內設有信息屏障，以阻止機密信息洩漏給負責私有化團隊之外的人員，但法院認定這樣的措施並非百分百保證。法院認為，涉案的律師與相關的上市公司不存在上述的關連性, 因為他不是負責私有化交易的團隊成員, 因而沒有資格獲得交易的保密信息。這一案例說明上述過時的關連性要求, 在一些情況下可能被內幕交易者利用作逃避法律責任.

在澳洲, 在ASIC v Citigroup一案中，花旗集團在澳大利亞的業務包括投資銀行和證券交易，兩個部門之間建立起信息屏障。花旗的投資銀行部是Toll控股有限公司（Toll）收購Patrick有限公司(Patrick)的財務顧問。Manchee是花旗股份交易部門的員工，他替花旗集團在收購公佈前一天購買了Patrick公司的股份。當投資銀行部門的員工發現這些買賣，便指示Manchee停止繼續購買Patrick的股份。Manchee卻把當天早前買入的Patrick股份賣出。ASIC對花旗的指控主要是兩方面：第一，給Manchee的指令是內幕信息，而之後Manchee賣出Patrick股份的行為就變成內幕交易; 第二，因為花旗的高管知道收購行動，因此他們知悉Manchee買賣Patrick的股票應該被視為花旗集團的知悉，從而使花旗集團為內幕交易負責。聯邦法院駁回ASIC這兩項理據，因為第一，Manchee不是花旗的高層人員、他對相關事實的知悉是不能歸屬於花旗集團，而且無論如何，ASIC未能證實Manchee在進行Patrick公司的股份買賣時知道花旗代表Toll收購Patrick; 第二點不能成立的原因是Manchee出售Patrick股票時，花旗已建立了有效的信息屏障。聯邦法院對這兩點的裁決是無可置疑的。

這兩件案件都有一些相似之處：兩件案件都涉及收購方顧問的員工所進行的交易（雖然在花旗集團的案件裡，該員工是替他的僱主進行交易）, 而涉案的兩家公司均存在信息屏障。然而，香港案件的內幕人士在進行交易時有明確的內幕信息，大澳大利亞案中的Manchee則不能被證明在交易時有內幕消息;香港案中被起訴的是顧問的僱員（和獲他提示內幕消息的人仕），但在澳洲案中針對的是顧問公司本身，但筆者認為如果ASIC不能證明Manchee知道花旗代表Toll收購 Patrick，其起訴一定會失敗，但即使ASIC能證明，這還是很難把Manchee的認知歸屬於花旗集團，除非ASIC能證明花旗集團董事會或管理層授權Manchee進行交易或Manchee是花旗的高管。但香港的起訴幾乎失敗的原因是上述關連性要求。由於澳洲廢除了關連性的要求，假設 Manchee知道了Toll的收購建議（無論是意外或故意），並自己進行交易，他肯定會被裁定內幕交易罪，但在香港則未必。

結論

總括而言，香港的內幕交易法律在許多重大方面落後於澳洲，儘管一些批評者仍然認為後者是過於複雜。但筆者卻認為儘管澳大利亞的內幕交易法可能比較複雜，但是該複雜性似乎是無可避免, 因為內幕交易法涉及禁制什麼人及什麼活動。 在這個意義上，一個更加複雜和縝密的制度總比一個過於簡單化的好, 因為過於簡化的法律條文會為市場參與者帶來不確定性和不可預測性。筆者認為，香港的內幕交易法有兩方面存在缺陷。首先，如上所述, 關連性的要求是不合理及過時的，而且不符合現今禁止內幕交易的主流理念（這些主流理念強調維持金融市場的誠信以及平等獲得企業信息，多於內幕交易人士是否受誠信責任所約束），因此筆者認為關連性的要求需要被廢除。另外，（一）交易的標的（即上市證券及其衍生品）及（二）內幕消息的定義過於狹窄，不能追上現今金融市場的瞬息萬變及金融產品的不斷創新的步伐。筆者認為沒有必要把這兩個概念與上市公司掛鉤。相反地，如Hill的案件中提到，這兩個概念可以伸延到與上市公司毫無關連的金融產品（如外匯孖展合約）。

但是，這種有關兩地內幕交易法涵蓋範圍的差異，可以從兩地負責的監管機構的權力理解。澳洲的ASIC主要是一個公司及法人的監管機構，它被賦予廣泛的調查權力，而這些權力不限於金融市場但也同時涵蓋所有澳洲法人涉嫌違反澳洲聯邦或州法律的欺詐和不誠實行為;但香港的證監會基本上只是一個香港證券和期貨市場的監管機構，只有 維護和促進證券及期貨業的公平、效率、競爭力、透明度和秩序的任務。 簡單來說，ASIC是一個企業警察，但香港證監會只是證券及期貨市場的監管者而已。

(本文節錄自戴國洪律師在澳洲新南威爾斯大學法律碩士”證券及金融市場監管”一科的論文,  作者保留所有版權。)